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A B S T R A C T
There is currently a considerable effort to evaluate the performance of Payments for Ecosystem Services
as an environmental management tool. The research presented here contributes to this work by using an
experimental design to evaluate Payments for Ecosystem Services as a tool for supporting biodiversity
conservation in the context of an African protected area. The trial employed a ‘before and after’ and ‘with
and without’ design. We present the results of social and ecological surveys to investigate the impacts of
the trial in terms of its effectiveness, efﬁciency and equity. We ﬁnd the scheme to be effective at bringing
about additional conservation outcomes. However, we also found that increased monitoring is similarly
effective in the short term, at lower cost. The major difference – and arguably the signiﬁcant contribution
of the Payments for Ecosystem Services – was that it changed the motives for protecting the park and
improved local perceptions both of the park and its authority. We discuss the implications of these
results for conservation efﬁciency, arguing that efﬁciency should not be deﬁned in terms of short-term
cost-effectiveness, but also in terms of the sustainability of behavioral motives in the long term. This
insight helps us to resolve the apparent trade-off between goals of equity and efﬁciency in Payments for
Ecosystem Services.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Global Environmental Change
jo ur n al h o mep ag e: www .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate /g lo envc h a1. Introduction
Early proponents of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)
argued that they offered a potential improvement upon Integrated
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs). ICDPs were
considered to be ineffective due to overly ambitious combinations
of environmental and social goals, and a lack of causal linkage
between delivery of social beneﬁts and desired conservation
outcomes (Ferraro and Simpson, 2005; Ferraro, 2001; Ferraro and
Kiss, 2002). Whilst recent studies identify some positive outcomes
from ICDPs in some cases (Blomley et al., 2010; Morgan-Brown
et al., 2010), advocates of PES propose that making beneﬁts directly
contingent on provision of outcomes would, in some circum-
stances, be more effective and that enabling competition among
possible service providers would also lead to efﬁciency gains.
There are still very few rigorous empirical studies that test this
proposition (Miteva et al., 2012) and this paper contributes to this
knowledge gap.
Such ‘direct payments for conservation’ were well known in
Europe, where paying farmers for conservation-oriented practices* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 01603593723.
E-mail address: adrian.martin@uea.ac.uk (A. Martin).
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0959-3780/ 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uwas already an important part of the Common Agricultural Policy’s
environment pillar (Gomez-Baggethun et al., 2010). There were
some concerns about the equity of these schemes, as farmers with
the largest land holdings were able to provide the most services and
received the greater payments (Wilson, 1997), but this was offset by
the political expedience of ﬁnding an eligible way to package farm
subsidies. However, concerns about the distributional outcomes of
PES schemes have become more salient because PES is now more
widespread in developing countries, in contexts where poverty
alleviation is often a desired co-beneﬁt of conservation interven-
tions (Pagiola et al., 2005). Thus the question of whether PES is more
effective in achieving desired outcomes and more cost-efﬁcient
than its alternatives must be considered alongside questions about
its impacts on poverty and, more generally, equity. Put simply, will
efﬁcient modes of providing environmental goods bypass the
poorest and be considered inequitable? We think this question will
become increasingly important because (a) those living near to
forests and terrestrial protected areas in the tropics are likely to be
poorer than their compatriots (Ferraro et al., 2011; Sunderlin et al.,
2008), (b) these locations where poverty and biodiversity coincide
will be increasingly targeted by PES schemes such as REDD+, for
example due to increasing conﬁdence in the evidence of synergies
between biodiversity conservation and carbon storage (Parrotta
et al., 2012), and (c) because the poor sell cheap due to lowernder the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
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lands (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). In this paper, we assess the
effectiveness, efﬁciency and equity of a PES scheme in Rwanda. As
the argument proceeds, we ask whether equity, rather than
efﬁciency, might in fact be the greatest advantage arising from
our PES and, following-on, whether efﬁciency and equity can really
be considered to be independent outcomes.
2. Theory
We deﬁne effectiveness as the achievement of stated objectives
additional to what would have been achieved in the absence of the
PES intervention. We provisionally deﬁne efﬁciency in utilitarian,
economic terms as maximizing total welfare (Adger et al., 2003); it
typically implies a ‘value for money’ characteristic whereby human
wellbeing outcomes are achieved at least cost so that we can afford
more of them.
Equity is not so amenable to a universal deﬁnition because it is
typically understood through reference to both objective and
contextual assessments (Miller, 2013). In pursuit of a more
objective and universal benchmark of equity, conservation
practitioners have tended to consider ‘equity’ to mean ‘pro-poor’
(Pascual et al., 2010). This more often refers to impacts on the
distribution of material costs and beneﬁts, but can also refer to
procedural inclusion, ways of interacting, and impacts on authority
and control. One way of operationalizing ‘pro-poor’ is to think
about the impact of an intervention on the difference between rich
and poor – does it increase or decrease the gap? By this reading, a
‘weak’ rendering of ‘pro-poor’ is that environmental management
interventions should ‘do no harm’ to the poor (Barrett et al., 2011).
A slightly stronger, Rawlsian egalitarian reading, is that any
deviation from equal treatment should be positively in favor of the
poor and, most particularly, the poorest (Rawls, 1971). In practice,
this tends to be interpreted as a call for positive discrimination,
with a ‘good’ outcome being a narrowing of the gap between rich
and poor (Brock, 2009).
A second way of operationalizing ‘pro-poor’ that is common in
the conservation literature is to associate it with a commitment to
uphold human rights (Greiber et al., 2009; Kashwan, 2013). For a
rights-based approach, pro-poor outcomes can be assessed from
the perspective of thresholds. For human capabilities and rights
thinkers, equity outcomes are at least partly judged by whether
states and other agents are striving to secure minimum material
and social thresholds – supporting those capabilities considered
minimally necessary to live a valued and digniﬁed life (Brock,
2009; Doyal and Gough, 1991; Gough, 2004; Nussbaum, 2011).
Given that our focal country, Rwanda, is a low income country
with high levels of rural poverty, we consider it appropriate to
consider a pro-poor conception of equity, especially given previous
evidence that the poor have often found it difﬁcult to participate in
PES schemes due to high transaction costs or structural barriers
(Corbera et al., 2007a,b; Engel et al., 2008). However, it is important
to recognize that what constitutes an equitable distribution can
vary from situation to situation as well as from person to person:
for example an ‘equal share’ might be considered the equitable way
to distribute votes, whereas ‘need’ might be seen as a more
equitable basis for allocation of aid, and merit the best way for
allocating employment (Deutsch, 2000; Martin et al., 2014).
Furthermore, different individuals and groups, perhaps with
afﬁnities to different political philosophies, may view each
situation differently, giving rise to plural, rational ideas about
the right thing to do (Sen, 2009). Moral valuation is therefore
contextual, determined by individual and social characteristics
across time and space, and not reducible to singular notions of the
‘good’, to simple aggregation, or to individualistic analysis (Sandel,
1998). Thus we reject the usefulness of looking for a singular,universal deﬁnition of the good, such as that presented in
utilitarian political philosophies (Nussbaum, 2011; Sen, 2009).
Our interest in this paper is the place-bound conceptions of equity
that are used by different groups to construct claims about the
fairness of conservation interventions and that we ultimately
consider to be related to conservation outcomes.
It is important to note that the acceptance of a pro-poor
conception of equity, as well as an inclination toward a pluralist
conceptions of the ends of justice, puts us in opposition to
utilitarianism (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 2009). Whilst utilitarianism is
equitable toward the poor in the sense that enhancement to all
people’s utility is equally valued, an ultimate concern with
aggregate utility is problematic. Firstly, to deﬁne the ends of
justice as the maximization of aggregate utility (the greater good)
is potentially consistent with allowing the poor to become poorer
or for minimum capability thresholds to be transgressed. Secondly,
the use of a single metric (utility) assumes that diverse values are
ultimately commensurate and suited to aggregation. We ﬂag this
point at the outset because it creates a tension between our
conceptions of efﬁciency and equity. Efﬁciency is concerned with
total welfare irrespective of its distribution, and so can be at odds
with equity goals. For example, through our efﬁciency lens we
might not be concerned if the poor sell their environmental
services ‘cheap’, whereas through our equity lens we might be.
The apparent trade-off between common working deﬁnitions of
efﬁciency (utilitarian, aggregate welfare gains) and equity
(egalitarian) cuts to the heart of many environmental dilemmas,
presenting a tension between ‘pursuit of the greatest happiness for
the greatest number, and the assertion of individual, local or ethnic
rights that ought not to be violated, even at the expense of the
aggregate good’ (Rayner and Malone, 2000). Such tension has
recently come to the fore in academic debate about PES (Corbera,
2012; Gross-Camp et al., 2012a; Kinzig et al., 2011; Pascual et al.,
2010). Whilst nobody denies that equity is important, there is
disagreement as to whether it should be a ﬁrst order objective of
PES. Whilst there is a spectrum of thinking, we think it is
reasonable to say that the dominant view of PES holds that, in
situations where PES is appropriate, utilitarian efﬁciency is its
principle advantage over alternatives, and should be the overriding
objective for the PES instrument itself (Ferraro and Simpson, 2005;
Kinzig et al., 2011; Wunder, 2007). This paper questions this view,
asking whether equity might in fact be so deeply linked to
efﬁciency that the latter cannot be prioritized or, alternatively, that
equity rather than efﬁciency might sometimes prove to be the
primary advantage of PES over some alternative conservation
practices such as a focus on rule enforcement alone.
The prioritization of effectiveness and efﬁciency poses some
problems for PES in practice. Firstly, there is the problem of
measuring the additional good provided by the intervention due to
scientiﬁc uncertainty about the link between land management
practices, ecosystem functions and service provision (Fisher et al.,
2009). Where this problem can be addressed, it will normally
require greatly increasing the transaction costs of monitoring.
Secondly, there is a problem of legitimacy, because not everyone
agrees that efﬁciency concerns should prevail over equity ones in
PES design (Pascual et al., 2010) and because humankind’s
deontological attachment to fairness is considered to be a widely
distributed human characteristic (Brock, 2009; Rawls, 1971; Sen,
2009) that might even be rooted in our neural processing (Hsu
et al., 2008). The fact that humans hold equity so dear may help to
explain why environmental conﬂicts often arise from competing
visions of fairness (Harvey, 1996; Redpath et al., 2013; Schlosberg,
2004; Whiteman, 2009) and indeed why ‘real’ PES schemes cannot
avoid meeting legitimacy requirements and therefore seldom
resemble their imaginary, ‘efﬁcient’ form (Milne and Adams, 2012;
Muradian et al., 2010). We contribute to this debate by asking
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equitable, and by considering the relationship between these
values.
3. Study site and PES features
The Nyungwe National Park (1013 km2) is part of the
biologically rich Albertine Rift (Plumptre et al., 2002) and one of
the largest remaining blocks of high altitude rain forest on the
continent. The park was initially gazetted as a forest reserve in the
early 1930s but had little rule enforcement up until the late 1980s
when the management authority, Rwanda Development Board
(RDB), was ﬁrst mandated to oversee activities in the reserve.
Although clearing of the forest for agriculture was prohibited, local
rights to collect wood were recognized and upheld in the early
1970s with the initiation of a buffer zone of fast-growing exotic
trees (Weber, 1989). The reserve transitioned to national park in
2004 and is now a strictly protected area with no human
inhabitants or permitted use. There are a total of 52 cells (an
administrative unit consisting of a cluster of 3–6 villages, and
population of 1500–6000 people) abutting the park. Our project
was based in a total of eight of these cells – four experimental and
four controls (Fig. 1).
Currently, there are only a small number of published PES
evaluations that seek to rigorously establish causal impact throughFig. 1. Location ouse of controls to construct counterfactuals (Pattanayak et al.,
2010). Furthermore, these are all in Latin America and all involve
PES schemes that incentivize management of household farm or
forest plots (Miteva et al., 2012). The site for this study is therefore
unusual, both for being in Africa, as well as for using PES for the
management of public- rather than privately-managed lands. This
is a critical site characteristic because it is well established that
tenure, amongst other institutional factors, is important for
understanding the outcomes of PES schemes (Tacconi et al., 2012).
There is considerable debate in the literature about what can
rightfully be described as a PES, and what should be considered
instead as ‘PES-like’ (Engel et al., 2008; Sommerville et al., 2009).
The deﬁning features of a PES scheme are widely cited as being (a)
that it is voluntary, (b) that a deﬁned environmental (?) service is
bought by one party from another party, and (c) payment is
conditional on provision of that deﬁned service (Wunder, 2005). In
our own PES trial, (a) communities enter into contracts voluntarily,
(b) we (a research partnership backed by EU funding) pay
communities to provide speciﬁed conservation services, and (c)
payments are conditional based on measured performance of those
services. Indeed, our PES was designed with these very criteria in
mind and on the face of it, there is a clear match. But as with most
schemes labeled as PES, there are gray areas. First, some might
question whether participation is voluntary for each individual,
given that entry is a collective decision. Second, the service wef study sites.
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monitor are proxy measures that we think will lead to this
(reduced tree cutting, hunting and mining, and increased tree
planting). Third, some might argue that some of these things are
covered by rules of the park and a PES should not pay for rule
abeyance. Fourth, one might also argue that PES transactions
should involve market exchange, or purchase by private sector
service buyers – although such criteria would make ‘real’ PES
vanishingly rare (Milne and Adams, 2012). We consider the key
criteria to be direct linkage, conditionality and the expectation of
additionality. Regarding linkage, what we pay for can reasonably
be expected to have a direct impact on the target service –
biodiversity. Regarding conditionality (?), our monitoring of
performance involved systematic monitoring of levels of provision,
with payments scaled accordingly. Concerning additionality, the
use of controls was designed to test whether any measured effects
were above and beyond those brought about by pre-existing rules
and enforcement. On balance we think it helpful to describe this as
a PES.
We provided ﬁnancial incentives to communities to reduce
activities that were widely considered to be detrimental to
biodiversity conservation, predominantly hunting with snares,
cutting trees, and mining. At the same time, we incentivized those
activities outside of the park that were considered to support
reduction of these in-park activities in the long-term, mainly
private tree and bamboo planting. Performance was measured
once a year and based upon the collective actions of the
community. Speciﬁc performance indicators and targets were
negotiated through community meetings in each of the four
participating cells. Performance targets were also informed by, and
measured against, baseline assessments. Methods of payment
were partly negotiated with communities. In particular, each
participating cell decided the proportion of total payment to be
retained for communal activities and the proportion to be
distributed at the household level (Gross-Camp et al., 2012a,b).
All payments were cash rather than in-kind, with communities on
average deciding to distribute 68% of total payments in equal
shares to each household, and to retain the remainder for
investment in community activities. Both parts were discussed
at public meetings and were both presented as part of the PES
payment.
Communities had complete discretion over how to spend the
collective part of the payment, spending it on, for example,
provision of tree saplings and purchase of goats for poorer families.
The level of payment was up to 25 USD per household annually,
determined to be the average opportunity cost for reduced park
access (using Masozera and Alavalpati, 2004). It was determined
through consultation with park authorities and community
representatives that the actual payment (conditionally awarded
and scaled according to performance monitoring) would be paid as
a ﬂat, undifferentiated rate to each household, regardless of
household-level opportunity cost. Elsewhere, we present evidence
that this equal distribution was the most widely held to be
equitable at local level, whilst distribution by opportunity cost was
the least popular conception of equity (Martin et al., 2014). As has
been argued in Section 2, conceptions of what is fair and equitable
are determined in context and this is a potential challenge for any
pre-determined view that the study of opportunity cost can help
establish payment levels that are fair and efﬁcient. We should also
note that, whilst it would have been possible to use our baseline
household surveys to differentiate household opportunity costs,
doing this rigorously would have added considerably to project
transaction costs. Furthermore, measuring performance at house-
hold level is impractical due to the public nature of the good – a
National Park. Thus, there was in practice something of a pragmatic
alignment between what communities wanted, and what waspossible. In terms of guiding objectives, there was also pragmatic
alignment between effectiveness and equity goals as the design of
the PES were adapted to local norms. For example, for the PES to be
successfully launched it was all but essential to align with local
stakeholders’ views about what constituted fair distribution of
payments.
The counterfactual was established through (1) control
communities with no PES but with similar additional monitoring
effort to the experimental units (e.g. similar surveying of human
activity along transects in the forest) and (2) the rest of the park
which had no PES and no additional monitoring. The counterfac-
tual that we constructed would clearly not satisfy the most
stringent standards for Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs).
Perhaps most importantly, it was not considered practical to
employ double- or even single-blinding into the design, and thus
members of both experimental and control cells were potentially
aware of their roles. As has been noted, the challenge of measuring
the effectiveness of PES typically requires a signiﬁcant and costly
monitoring effort. In this case, monitoring could not be conducted
remotely and required on-the-ground observation of forest-based
activities through regular visits by monitoring teams.
As a research-oriented trial, the short duration of the project
meant that payments only lasted for two years, which is a shorter
commitment period than most PES schemes. We consulted at
length with local authorities how best to handle this in order to
avoid any potential negative impacts when payments ﬁnished. The
resultant approach was one of open communication – to stress in
all of our dealings with communities and other stakeholders that
this was a temporary trial. For communities, this was hardly
unusual, in the sense that it conforms to their experience of project
interventions.
4. Methods
The basic design of the study was (a) ‘with and without’,
through selection and monitoring of both experimental and
control locations and (b) ‘before and after’ through baseline social
and ecological surveys in 2009 and subsequent surveys to monitor
change. We established an experimental PES in four selected cells
adjacent to the Nyungwe National Park. Three cells were randomly
selected with the fourth (Uwumusebeya) being intentionally
included based on the expressed interest of our project partners
and park authority. Uwumusebeya is adjacent to the largest
bamboo ecosystem in the park (3174 ha) which is home to a rare
and endemic primate, the owl-faced monkey (Cercopithecus
hamlynii). The bamboo has multiple uses, including construction,
household and agricultural instruments such as baskets, and
making snares for trapping animals. The four control cells were
located adjacent to experimental cells in an effort to improve
matching and potentially capture problems of leakage of human
activities from experimental cells. We considered the potential
beneﬁts of placing controls further from the experimental cells (i.e.
to try to reduce contamination) but decided that this would add
signiﬁcantly to our monitoring costs and still not eliminate the
likelihood that our presence (forest monitoring and household
surveys) would inﬂuence people’s behavior. Distant controls
would equally have been less well matched.
Human activity monitoring by the PES team (ReDirect). Human
activity in the park was measured by walking the existing trail
system within a deﬁned sub-section of the park abutting each cell
and geo-referencing deﬁned human activities as they were found.
The existing trail system was geo-referenced in 2009 when
baseline information was collected and followed during subse-
quent surveys. A total of 7 surveys were conducted in each of the 8
cells over the course of the study. The monitored area was deﬁned
by drawing perpendicular lines 2.5 km from the edge of a cell’s
Table 1
A summary of the selected generalized linear model (via likelihood ratio tests for
nested models) using a log-link function and negative binomial distribution to
investigate change in human activity through time in control and experimental
cells as collected by the PES team (ReDirect). Under this model, logs of expected
monthly activity counts in experimental cells are expected to be almost one unit
lower than those of control cells. (0 ‘***’, 0.001 ‘**’, and 0.01 ‘*’).
GLM human activity (PES)
Snare & tree cuttings
Estimate z value
Intercept 2.05 6.75***
Number of patrols 0.37 6.16***
Month 0.04 2.30*
Cell type (exp) 0.98 3.45***
Log-likelihood 298.65
AIC 308.65
Sample size 20
Fig. 2. The mean number of human activities or threats per patrol through time in
control and experimental cells using data collected by the PES team (N = 20
sampling months).
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chosen based on previous research that found human activity
tends to occur within 1.5 km of protected area boundaries and
sharply declines at a distance greater than 5 km (Waas, 1995). We
examined whether human activities differed signiﬁcantly by cell
type (control versus experimental) through time using a general-
ized linear model on the mean number of human activities (snares
and wood cutting) using R version 2.15.1 and the MASS 7.3-18
package. We utilized a log-link function and negative binomial
model based on overdispersion of the data set in the Poisson GLM.
Human activity monitoring by the park authority. Ranger-based
monitoring (RBM) data were collected by the park authority,
Rwanda Development Board, our partners on this project. The RBM
is collected by rangers that extensively patrol the park’s existing
trail system on an approximately daily basis, geo-referencing a
broad number of observations of human impact. We utilized the
RBM data overlapping with the period of our PES (2009–2012) to
examine the park-wide human activities (i.e. limited to snares and
wood cutting) as well as activities within areas where the PES was
active. Patrols and their associated ﬁndings were isolated using
ArcGIS v. 9.3 and the shapeﬁles of our monitored areas. Similar to
the data collected by ReDirect, we utilized a negative binomial
GLM to determine whether human activity differed signiﬁcantly
through time in areas where the PES was active (control and
experimental cells) from that of park-wide trends. To test for
trends over time, Mann–Kendall tests were run using the Kendall
2.2 package.
Livelihood survey data. We collected extensive livelihood
information in all eight cells, experimental and control, in 2009
and 2012. Forty-eight households in each cell were randomly
selected for interviews (N = 376, 8 households were lost in 2012
due to death and movement). The baseline interviews were
conducted in September 2009 and the same households re-
interviewed at the end of the study in early 2012. These interviews
enabled us to calculate household consumption as a measurement
of wealth and included the market value of items consumed from
the park, food items, durable goods (e.g. bicycles, radios), social
events, and educational expenses. Mean market values were
established through a series of price surveys in markets close to the
cells where interviews occurred coinciding with the livelihood
interviews in 2009 and 2012. All analyses of the survey data were
done in SPSS.
5. Results
5.1. Effectiveness
A generalized linear model (GLM) showed signiﬁcantly fewer
human activities in the experimental cells (Cell type (exp) 0.98)
than control cells with a small downward trend for both cell types
over the course of the study period (Month 0.04; Table 1).
However, there was no signiﬁcant interaction between cell type
and month (data for more complex models with interaction terms
not shown, model selection carried out via likelihood ratio tests)
indicating that this downward trend was of a similar nature in both
experimental and control cells (Fig. 2). In other words although the
model suggests that experimental cells have a lower rate of human
activity than controls, the rate of change through time is similar
suggesting that something is inﬂuencing human activity in both
cell types.
We generated alternative hypotheses to explain this ﬁnding.
Our null hypothesis proposed that the PES intervention was
ineffective insomuch as human activity was changing as a park-
wide process and that the trends observed in the model above
(Table 1) were merely a reﬂection of that process. We considered
this speciﬁcally in relation to the service of biodiversity gains fromreduced human activity within the park. To test this we utilized
ranger-based monitoring (RBM) data collected by the park
authority (RDB) to compare park-wide human activity with our
experimental and control cells. The selected RBM data model
(again chosen via likelihood ratio tests of nested models) indicated
signiﬁcant differences in the level of human activity by cell type
(Table 2). Human activity in the experimental cells was
signiﬁcantly less than that of the control cells (Cell type (exp)
2.661), whereas the activity throughout the park was higher but
not signiﬁcantly so (Cell type (park-wide) 0.779). Furthermore, an
examination of model terms including ‘Month’ showed that trends
over time were different in all three cell types, with a slight
increase in observed human activity throughout the park over time
as well as in experimental cells, and a slight decrease in control
cells (Month: Cell type interactions). However, the net effect in
experimental cells (the estimate value for Cell type (exp) is the
single greatest value of the model) suggests that the level of human
activity in these areas is signiﬁcantly lower from that in both the
control and parkwide, i.e. something is strongly suppressing
human activity in these cells.
Additional Mann–Kendall trend tests corroborated the ﬁnding
that park-wide activities are increasing slightly, but lacked
signiﬁcance for a downward trend in control cells, presumably
due in part to the weakness of the trend (park-wide: tau = 0.23,
p = 0.05, control: tau = 0.15, p = 0.20; Fig. 3a and b). Experimental
Table 2
A summary of the selected generalized linear model (via likelihood ratio tests of
nested models) using a log-link function and negative binomial distribution to
investigate change in human activity in areas where the PES was active (control and
experimental cells) as well as park-wide. These data were collected by the park
authority (RDB) ranger-based monitoring program. (0 ‘***’, 0.001 ‘**’, and 0.01 ‘*’).
GLM human activity (RBM)
Snares & tree cuttings
Estimate z value
Intercept 1.884 3.359***
Number of patrols 0.020 0.583
Month 0.070 2.714**
Cell type (exp) 2.661 3.424***
Cell type (park-wide) 0.779 1.004
Number of patrols: Month 0.004 2.209*
Number of patrols: Cell type
(exp)
0.228 3.952***
Number of patrols: Cell type
(park-wide)
0.009 0.274
Month: Cell type (exp) 0.095 2.668**
Month: Cell type (park-wide) 0.078 2.457*
Number of patrols: Month:
Cell type (exp)
0.009 3.108**
Number of patrols: Month:
Cell type (park wide)
0.004 2.170*
Log-likelihood 665.961
AIC 691.96
Sample size 36
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(experimental: tau = 0.12, p = 0.32; Fig. 3c) yet activity appears to
be decreasing after the ﬁrst initial months of the project,
suggesting that this change may be due in part to the PES
intervention (Fig. 3d; an observation supported by a subsequentFig. 3. The mean number of human activities or threats per patrol over the course of t
monitoring data collected by the management authority, RDB).Mann–Kendall test, experimental truncated: tau = 0.30, p = 0.02).
We therefore reject the null hypothesis that the trends in the ﬁrst
model (Table 1) are merely a reﬂection of park-wide trends and
conclude that the PES intervention has had a signiﬁcant impact on
levels of human activity in experimental (and potentially
neighboring control) cells, but with experimental cells showing
the lowest activity levels of all.
5.2. Efﬁciency
The second alternative hypothesis concerning the lack of a
signiﬁcant difference between the rate of change in human activity
levels through time between control and experimental cells (of the
ReDirect data set Table 1) is due to contamination of controls by
the additional monitoring effort – i.e. they are not true counter-
factuals. The difﬁculty of providing adequate controls in conser-
vation research is well known (Soule and Orians, 2001). One reason
for this is that it is both impractical and/or unethical to apply a
double-blinded or even a single-blinded experimental design.
Resulting bias can include the Hawthorne effect, whereby
participants change behavior in response to being monitored,
rather than or in addition to responding to the intervention itself;
and the John Henry effect, whereby controls change their behavior
in response to knowing that they are being compared to an
experimental group (Fuente and Whittington, 2012; Zwane et al.,
2011). John Henry was a steel worker who worked himself to death
in the 1870s having learned that his performance was being
compared to that of a steam-powered drill (Irving and Holden,
2013). In our case there were at least two unavoidable sources of
contamination. Firstly, it was not practical to create controls that
we could be certain to be blind to their role. Indeed, it was
necessary to consult with local leaders to ensure that they werehe PES with a lowess smoothing line to depict the trend of activity (ranger-based
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our hypothesis, becoming a control involved being monitored by
teams on the ground, which may itself lead to behavioral change.
Regarding the possibility of a John Henry effect, we undertook a
small survey in control cells and found that 23% (n = 17 of 73) of
respondents could correctly answer three questions about the PES
scheme, conﬁrming that communication about the trial was
indeed taking place and that the control was not fully blind.
Furthermore, 44% of respondents from control cells stated that
reduced illicit activities in the park were partly due to expectations
of future inclusion in a PES scheme (Figure B1).
However, our research shows that the second type of contami-
nation (the effect of our additional monitoring in the controls) was
the most important. When asked to identify the single most
important reason for reduced illicit activities in their cell, no
respondent cited expected PES inclusion whilst 50% (n = 29 of 58)
cited the presence of park guards (Figure B1). PES monitoring
activities in the park occurred every four months and involved the
presence of a team of 6 people that spent approximately one week in
the area. Whilst the monitoring team are not in fact ‘park guards’ we
learned that local people tended to associate them with the
management authority (RDB). This is conﬁrmed by ﬁndings that
households in both experimental and control cells reported a
signiﬁcant increase in interaction with park authority staff between
2009 and 2012 (paired t-test: control t(175) = 11.51, p < 0.0001
and participating t(180) = 20.61, p < 0.0001; Figure B2).
These results suggest that the PES trial has not been cost-
effective, because a similar outcome has been achieved in controls
(in the short term at least), as a result of enhanced monitoring alone,
at lower intervention cost. The cost of ecological and social
monitoring was on average 3068 and 6793 USD per cell respectively,
the same for participating and control cells. The cost of payments,0
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Fig. 4. Quartiles of household consumption with standard error bars in control and exp
1 USD = 600 RWF).for participating cells only, was 23,110 USD per cell per year. Lack
of cost-effectiveness is likely here to reduce efﬁciency, in the
sense that we assume the conservation outcome to bring welfare
beneﬁts and that a more cost-effective intervention could produce
a greater total welfare gain. However, as our discussion of equity
will reveal, there is yet a crucial distinction to be made between
the impact of the project on experimental versus control cells.
5.3. Equity
Because conceptions of equity tend to be context speciﬁc we
investigated whether an egalitarian perspective resonated with
local norms. We tested a total of four alternative principles for
payment distribution and found that respondents selected
egalitarian (38%) as their ﬁrst choice more often than expected
by chance (N = 78, Chi-square = 14.4, df = 3, p = 0.002). The
alternative principles of ‘effort’, ‘need’ and, ‘opportunity costs’
were ranked ﬁrst by 29%, 23% and 9% of respondents, respectively.
Similarly respondents’ least preferred method of payment
distribution was opportunity costs, with 54% ranking this last
(Chi-square = 35.3, df = 3, p = <0.001). Whilst this may be a favored
system of distribution for utilitarian efﬁciency, it was reported to
us to be morally perverse (and unpalatable to our RDB partners)
because it is seen as rewarding the worst offenders.
The size of annual household PES payments was calculated to
offset costs rather than enhance income. As expected, we found no
signiﬁcant change in household consumption (as an indication of
wealth) across all cells as well as between cells, control and
experimental (Wilcoxon signed-rank: z = 0.98, p = 0.32 and
z = 0.83 and 0.48, p > 0.05, respectively) based on panel data
collected in 2009 and 2012 (N = 357 households). We are more
interested in the distribution of any income effects and how this islower me dian upp er
E E E
rol ('C ') and  experimental (' E') cell s
erimental cells (N = 176 and 181 for control and experimental cells, respectively;
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hold, we ﬁnd some evidence that the lowest income quartiles are
doing relatively well in that their consumption growth is favorable
compared to other quartiles (Fig. 4). Given a range of possible
confounding factors, we cannot conﬁdently attribute any such
change to the project, but this at least supports the view that the
project did no obvious harm to the material wellbeing of the
poorest.
We further assessed equity by testing for elite capture of
beneﬁts – given that less than 100% of households actually
received the payments they were due1 (Figure B3), and consider-
ably less gained other beneﬁts, was there evidence of discrimina-
tion against the poor? We examined the relationship between
wealth and the likelihood of receiving (a) each of the three PES
payments made over the course of the project, (b) employment as
local monitors, (c) receipt of small livestock and/or tree saplings,
and (d) involvement in anti-crop raiding programs. None of these
relationships were signiﬁcant suggesting that distribution con-
formed to an egalitarian conception of equity (Table A1 and Figure
B4). The exception to this was the observation that a small number
(n = 6 of 29) of households receiving free livestock were among the
highest income quintile that contrasts with our stated objective to
target the poor.
In addition to distribution of material beneﬁts, we also
considered the equity of social impacts. We were particularly
interested in whether PES might lead to injustices arising from
failures of recognition, including insensitivity to local culture and
the undermining of non-monetary ways of valuing interactions
with the environment. Qualitative interviews revealed hardly any
concern with cultural loss or domination arising from the PES. The
attachment of monetary value to particular practices was not
articulated as dominating other ways of valuing livelihood
practices or relationships with nature. We also found very little
concern about the fact that the incentive structure of the PES led to
a deepening of antagonism toward traditional forest uses such as
hunting. We want to stress that these ﬁndings are highly context-
speciﬁc and reﬂective of a particular Rwandan historical process of
modernization that tends to construct notions of progress in
contrast to traditional cultural practices associated with a violent
past (Martin et al., 2014).
A related concern in critical PES literature is that extrinsic
incentives introduced through PES might lead to a ‘crowding out’ of
intrinsic motives for conservation (Corbera, 2012; Fisher, 2012;
Sommerville et al., 2009). There is strong empirical evidence that
material interests and moral sentiments are inseparable and that
crowding-out (and in) occurs because economic incentives affect
individuals’ moral framing of a situation (Bowles, 2008; Frey and
Jegen, 2001), as can the institutional features of these incentives
(Falk and Szech, 2013). Of particular relevance to equity, the
psychological conditions that foster crowding-out include those
where an intervention is perceived to be unfair, such as where it is
domineering and undermines self-determination (Frey and Jegen,
2001) or where it allows free-riders to prosper (Bowles, 2008).
Moreover, the correlate may also be true, that intrinsic motivations
might be crowded-in where an intervention is perceived to support
local control and self-determination (Frey and Jegen, 2001).
We provide here evidence that the PES did indeed change the
motives underlying observed behavioral change. The key ﬁnding is
that whilst the project as a whole led to similar conservation
outcomes in both experimental and control cells, there was an1 Distribution of payments to nearly 4000 households required that all
households had savings accounts that allowed direct cash transfers from a bank.
Whilst it was government policy for all households to have such ‘SACCO’ accounts,
cell level ofﬁcials still had to work hard to get 100% coverage and there were some
inevitable teething problems.important difference in how people perceived their behavioral
change leading to such outcomes. To link this difference to the
theory of crowding-in and -out is admittedly rather more
speculative at this moment, but we think promising enough to
warrant some discussion. Respondents in experimental cells
increasingly agreed that participation in decision-making was
the main reason for reducing illegal activities in the park (Table 3).
In contrast control cells have become less likely to attribute the
reduction in illegal activities to participation and environmental
education and more likely to attribute it to law enforcement.
We used qualitative data to further explore how the PES
changed motives. We coded 357 responses to an open question
about why human activity in the park had reduced (Table A2).
Three answers dominated, with 65% (n = 481 of 744) of coded
responses stating (i) enforcement by park management, (ii)
education about the park’s ecological importance and rules, or
(iii) the PES scheme. We then selected out only those responses
that were premised by words to the effect that ‘this is the main
reason for such behavioral change’. This yielded 86 observations,
where 66% (n = 29 of 44) of control respondents identiﬁed
enforcement as the main reason, compared to 21% (n = 9 of 42)
of participant respondents (Table A3). Fifty-ﬁve percent of the
respondents from experimental cells cited the PES scheme as the
main cause of change with their statements suggesting that the
non-pecuniary aspects of the PES (participation, education) are just
as important as the money. What we take with conﬁdence from
these ﬁndings is that the PES changed local perceptions of the
motivations for park protection, away from fear of rule enforce-
ment and toward the PES scheme itself, which is associated not
only with monetary beneﬁts but also increased participation
(Table 3, question b).
These differences in perception are hardly trivial in terms of the
experience of local people and the implications for longer-term
conservation practice. In control cells, respondents are very clear
that they are changing behavior in response to fears that park staff
will ﬁne and beat them, and even shoot them. Examples of
statements made during interviews give a sense of how serious
this difference is:
‘The core reason why human activities have decreased in our
cell is the reinforcement of the law along with heavy punish-
ments. Three people have been killed when caught in the park.’
(Rukore cell)
‘Illegal activities in the park have reduced because ORTPN [RDB]
increased its effort in protecting the park and sensitising the
population. Also, there have been people who were shot and
died, and this made people fear.’ (Kiyabo cell)
We have found the contrast with statements made in
participating cells to be notable, for example:
‘The illegal activities in the park reduced because we were
sensitised and given some money from ReDirect which we used
to sustain our households.’ (Shaba cell)
‘The community was sensitised by ReDirect on the conservation
of Nyungwe and given payments, which many people bought
rabbits with—one male and one female. Instead of going into
the park for meat, they could eat their own rabbits.’ (Gahurizo
cell)
More generally, our surveys found that those in cells with PES
are more likely to perceive beneﬁts of living adjacent to the park, to
say that the park authorities are sensitive to their needs and
opinions, and that they beneﬁt from the presence of park
authorities. We also see signiﬁcantly more tree-planting in PES
Table 3
Mean values (SE) are based on a Likert scale where 1 equals strongly agree and 5 strongly disagree. (0 ‘***’, 0.001 ‘**’, and 0.01 ‘*’).
2009 2012 Repeated measures
The main factor that stops
people from entering the park is:
Experimental Control Experimental Control Between
years
Between
years  cell type
Mean (SE) Mean (SE)
a. Law enforcement (RDB) 2.23 (0.08) 2.13 (0.09) 2.14 (0.06) 1.68 (0.06) F1,332 = 5.52* F1,332 = 15.31***
b. Involvement in park
management (participation)
2.28 (0.08) 2.31 (0.09) 2.16 (0.06) 2.60 (0.09) F1,343 = 0.67 F1,343 = 4.84*
c. Environmental education
that they receive
1.82 (0.05) 2.31 (0.09) 1.94 (0.06) 2.55 (0.10) F1,342 = 0.39 F1,342 = 10.7***
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resources.
In terms of crowding in and out, what we think we are seeing is
that the PES introduces new motives for caring for the forest (based
on economic beneﬁts and opportunities for better relationships
with authorities), whilst not crowding out older, intrinsic motives.
Thinking about this from the perspective of motivation crowding
theory (Frey and Jegen, 2001), we propose that the taking on of
new, positive motives is aided by perceptions of the equitable
design of this PES scheme (participatory, egalitarian), i.e. that
perceptions of equity, such as perceived progress toward self-
determination, have served as antecedents of developing new
motives. The absence of crowding out is largely concluded because
respondents have never highlighted to us prior intrinsic motiva-
tions for park protection. We have explored this absence through
focus groups and it seems that such motivations were crowded out
much earlier through progressive fear of authority since Nyungwe
was ﬁrst gazetted in the 1930s (Martin et al., 2014).
6. Discussion
We have found that it is possible to design an effective PES
scheme to support protection of a park. However, whilst the PES
was effective at reducing threats to the park’s biodiversity,
compared to changes in the park as a whole, it was not more
effective than our controls. Because controls were not blinded, they
in fact turned out not to be true controls but an alternative
treatment based on additional monitoring activity in the absence
of ﬁnancial incentives. We found that this alternative treatment
had as much of an impact on our measures of human activity in the
park as did the PES. The equity dimension was evaluated in relation
to pro-poor distribution of material beneﬁts, ﬁnding that poorer
groups were as likely to beneﬁt as the wealthier ones, and little
evidence of the distributional inequity observed in some other PES
schemes (Corbera, 2012; Mahanty et al., 2013), though not all (Li
et al., 2011). Equity was also evaluated in social terms, considering
whether the PES is considered to dominate and exclude non-
economic values and, connected to this, whether it crowds-out
non-economic motivation for park protection. We found that
crowding-out is a moot point in this part of Rwanda, because the
erosion of culturally particular ways of valuing nature was already
far advanced. We did however ﬁnd some evidence to propose that
crowding-in might be a more relevant phenomenon, with some
evidence that perceptions of procedural equity in particular might
help to foster the psychological conditions conducive to the
development of non-fear based conservation motives. This
suggested role for perceived procedural equity broadly concurs
with what is already known about the contexts that foster
crowding-in over crowding-out (d’Adda, 2011; Frey and Jegen,
2001).
If one removes equity as a high order objective, the PES was not
efﬁcient (in the short term) because the environmental objective
could have been achieved at lower economic cost, bringing greateraggregate expected welfare gains to current and future people.
However, we think that equity might actually have been the most
important impact of this particular PES. There is a normative
reason for thinking this – quite simply, we think that projects that
are perceived as equitable are preferable to those that are not. But
there is also an instrumental reason for thinking this – that
inequity can undermine efﬁciency in the long run due to conﬂict
(Collier and Hoefﬂer, 2004; Esteban and Ray, 2011; Ibarra et al.,
2011; Redpath et al., 2013; Robbins et al., 2009; To et al., 2012), and
more positively, that equity might serve to ‘crowd-in’ more
sustainable motives for conservation, such as the positive beneﬁts
that can ﬂow from a forest, that will serve its efﬁciency in the long
term. The latter remains quite speculative and requires further
research effort.
In trying to evaluate the evidence, the key fact before us is that
both experimental and control cells achieved broadly the same
quantitative conservation outcome but for qualitatively different
reasons. In control cells behavioral change was motivated by fear of
park guards but in experimental cells there was a greater shift
toward additional motives based on enhanced education about the
environment, and a greater sense of involvement in park
management which is tied in with perceptions of equity. This
poses a challenge to our working deﬁnition of efﬁciency because, if
we stick with this deﬁnition, our control cells (a ‘more guards’
intervention) appear to be the more efﬁcient. And yet, motives and
feelings about management legitimacy are likely to determine how
well behavioral change is sustained, and more generally, the level
of cooperation with park authorities.
We are implying here that inequity might undermine efﬁciency
in the longer run, and thus that the two are fundamentally linked.
One mechanism suggested for this is that perceptions of inequity
undermine cooperative behavior and foster conﬂictive behavior
(Deutsch, 2000; Martin et al., 2011). Whilst competitive relations
can foster efﬁciency in the context of markets, PES schemes rarely
resemble markets (Milne and Adams, 2012). Most PES schemes,
including our case study, are more about public goods provision,
and thus require cooperation. To prioritize competition over
cooperation would be a myopic vision of efﬁciency (Jennings,
2005; Marglin, 2010). By contrast, if we look at efﬁciency with a
longer time horizon, we are able to see that non-cost factors such
as equity effect longer-term outcomes (Adhikari and Boag, 2013;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010), and thus
should be constitutive of our vision of both effectiveness and
efﬁciency.
In summary, we are offering preliminary theory and evidence to
propose that observed efﬁciency/equity trade-offs might be
resolved by expanding the time horizon and disciplinary scope
of our evaluative framework. We cannot be certain that inequitable
PES design will lead to conﬂict, or even the extent to which any
such conﬂict would inﬂate transaction costs. This is in part because
conﬂicts can occur early on and these schemes simply never get off
the ground, making it hard to study cases of failure (Corbera, 2012;
Wunder et al., 2008). But it is also because conﬂict can take time to
A. Martin et al. / Global Environmental Change 28 (2014) 216–226 225become apparent and there is growing case study evidence from
some of the longer running PES schemes that perceived inequities
in procedure or distribution are linked to conﬂicts (Corbera et al.,
2007b, 2009; Garcia-Amado et al., 2011; Locatelli et al., 2008).
As a ﬁnal word, we should reiterate that what passes for
equitable cannot be universally prescribed. For example, in this
particular context of access to a public good, we found that
opportunity cost was not considered an equitable basis for
determining payment distribution. But in other contexts, notably
use of private farmlands, it may well be. The point for policymakers
then, is that it is important to understand equity-in-context.
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